2017-05-11 12:12:47 +02:00
|
|
|
{ stdenv, callPackage, fetchurl, fetchpatch, fetchgit
|
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|
, withInternalQemu ? true
|
|
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|
, withInternalTraditionalQemu ? true
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|
, withInternalSeabios ? true
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|
, withSeabios ? !withInternalSeabios, seabios ? null
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, withInternalOVMF ? false # FIXME: tricky to build
|
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, withOVMF ? false, OVMF
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, withLibHVM ? true
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# qemu
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, udev, pciutils, xorg, SDL, pixman, acl, glusterfs, spice_protocol, usbredir
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, alsaLib
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, ... } @ args:
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assert withInternalSeabios -> !withSeabios;
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|
assert withInternalOVMF -> !withOVMF;
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|
with stdenv.lib;
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# Patching XEN? Check the XSAs at
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# https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/
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# and try applying all the ones we don't have yet.
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let
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xsaPatch = { name , sha256 }: (fetchpatch {
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url = "https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/xsa${name}.patch";
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inherit sha256;
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});
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2017-10-27 23:57:03 +02:00
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xsa = import ./xsa-patches.nix { inherit fetchpatch; };
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2017-05-11 12:12:47 +02:00
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qemuDeps = [
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|
udev pciutils xorg.libX11 SDL pixman acl glusterfs spice_protocol usbredir
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alsaLib
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];
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in
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|
callPackage (import ./generic.nix (rec {
|
2017-10-27 23:57:03 +02:00
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|
version = "4.8.2";
|
2017-05-11 12:12:47 +02:00
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|
src = fetchurl {
|
2017-10-27 23:57:03 +02:00
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|
|
url = "https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/${version}/xen-${version}.tar.gz";
|
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|
|
sha256 = "1ydgwbn8ab0s16jrbi3wzaa6j0y3zk0j8pay458qcgayk3qc476b";
|
2017-05-11 12:12:47 +02:00
|
|
|
};
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# Sources needed to build tools and firmwares.
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|
xenfiles = optionalAttrs withInternalQemu {
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|
"qemu-xen" = {
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|
src = fetchgit {
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|
url = https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/qemu-xen.git;
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|
rev = "refs/tags/qemu-xen-${version}";
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|
sha256 = "1v19pp86kcgwvsbkrdrn4rlaj02i4054avw8k70w1m0rnwgcsdbs";
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|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
buildInputs = qemuDeps;
|
|
|
|
|
patches = [
|
xen: patch for XSAs: 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, and 224 (xen 4.8)
This commit contains security patches for xen 4.8. The patches
for XSA-216 applied to the kernel are omitted, as they are part of
80e0cda7ff92233edc94161eae5838a1c423e5e4.
XSA-216 Issue Description:
> The block interface response structure has some discontiguous fields.
> Certain backends populate the structure fields of an otherwise
> uninitialized instance of this structure on their stacks, leaking
> data through the (internal or trailing) padding field.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-216.html
XSA-217 Issue Description:
> Domains controlling other domains are permitted to map pages owned by
> the domain being controlled. If the controlling domain unmaps such a
> page without flushing the TLB, and if soon after the domain being
> controlled transfers this page to another PV domain (via
> GNTTABOP_transfer or, indirectly, XENMEM_exchange), and that third
> domain uses the page as a page table, the controlling domain will have
> write access to a live page table until the applicable TLB entry is
> flushed or evicted. Note that the domain being controlled is
> necessarily HVM, while the controlling domain is PV.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-217.html
XSA-218 Issue Description:
> We have discovered two bugs in the code unmapping grant references.
>
> * When a grant had been mapped twice by a backend domain, and then
> unmapped by two concurrent unmap calls, the frontend may be informed
> that the page had no further mappings when the first call completed rather
> than when the second call completed.
>
> * A race triggerable by an unprivileged guest could cause a grant
> maptrack entry for grants to be "freed" twice. The ultimate effect of
> this would be for maptrack entries for a single domain to be re-used.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-218.html
XSA-219 Issue Description:
> When using shadow paging, writes to guest pagetables must be trapped and
> emulated, so the shadows can be suitably adjusted as well.
>
> When emulating the write, Xen maps the guests pagetable(s) to make the final
> adjustment and leave the guest's view of its state consistent.
>
> However, when mapping the frame, Xen drops the page reference before
> performing the write. This is a race window where the underlying frame can
> change ownership.
>
> One possible attack scenario is for the frame to change ownership and to be
> inserted into a PV guest's pagetables. At that point, the emulated write will
> be an unaudited modification to the PV pagetables whose value is under guest
> control.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-219.html
XSA-220 Issue Description:
> Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) and Protection Key (PKU) are features in
> newer processors, whose state is intended to be per-thread and context
> switched along with all other XSAVE state.
>
> Xen's vCPU context switch code would save and restore the state only
> if the guest had set the relevant XSTATE enable bits. However,
> surprisingly, the use of these features is not dependent (PKU) or may
> not be dependent (MPX) on having the relevant XSTATE bits enabled.
>
> VMs which use MPX or PKU, and context switch the state manually rather
> than via XSAVE, will have the state leak between vCPUs (possibly,
> between vCPUs in different guests). This in turn corrupts state in
> the destination vCPU, and hence may lead to weakened protections
>
> Experimentally, MPX appears not to make any interaction with BND*
> state if BNDCFGS.EN is set but XCR0.BND{CSR,REGS} are clear. However,
> the SDM is not clear in this case; therefore MPX is included in this
> advisory as a precaution.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-220.html
XSA-221 Issue Description:
> When polling event channels, in general arbitrary port numbers can be
> specified. Specifically, there is no requirement that a polled event
> channel ports has ever been created. When the code was generalised
> from an earlier implementation, introducing some intermediate
> pointers, a check should have been made that these intermediate
> pointers are non-NULL. However, that check was omitted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-221.html
XSA-222 Issue Description:
> Certain actions require removing pages from a guest's P2M
> (Physical-to-Machine) mapping. When large pages are in use to map
> guest pages in the 2nd-stage page tables, such a removal operation may
> incur a memory allocation (to replace a large mapping with individual
> smaller ones). If this allocation fails, these errors are ignored by
> the callers, which would then continue and (for example) free the
> referenced page for reuse. This leaves the guest with a mapping to a
> page it shouldn't have access to.
>
> The allocation involved comes from a separate pool of memory created
> when the domain is created; under normal operating conditions it never
> fails, but a malicious guest may be able to engineer situations where
> this pool is exhausted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-222.html
XSA-224 Issue Description:
> We have discovered a number of bugs in the code mapping and unmapping
> grant references.
>
> * If a grant is mapped with both the GNTMAP_device_map and
> GNTMAP_host_map flags, but unmapped only with host_map, the device_map
> portion remains but the page reference counts are lowered as though it
> had been removed. This bug can be leveraged cause a page's reference
> counts and type counts to fall to zero while retaining writeable
> mappings to the page.
>
> * Under some specific conditions, if a grant is mapped with both the
> GNTMAP_device_map and GNTMAP_host_map flags, the operation may not
> grab sufficient type counts. When the grant is then unmapped, the
> type count will be erroneously reduced. This bug can be leveraged
> cause a page's reference counts and type counts to fall to zero while
> retaining writeable mappings to the page.
>
> * When a grant reference is given to an MMIO region (as opposed to a
> normal guest page), if the grant is mapped with only the
> GNTMAP_device_map flag set, a mapping is created at host_addr anyway.
> This does *not* cause reference counts to change, but there will be no
> record of this mapping, so it will not be considered when reporting
> whether the grant is still in use.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-224.html
2017-06-26 14:12:33 +02:00
|
|
|
(xsaPatch {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "216-qemuu";
|
2017-08-08 19:40:50 +02:00
|
|
|
sha256 = "06w2iw1r5gip2bpbg19cziws965h9in0f6np74cr31f76yy30yxn";
|
xen: patch for XSAs: 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, and 224 (xen 4.8)
This commit contains security patches for xen 4.8. The patches
for XSA-216 applied to the kernel are omitted, as they are part of
80e0cda7ff92233edc94161eae5838a1c423e5e4.
XSA-216 Issue Description:
> The block interface response structure has some discontiguous fields.
> Certain backends populate the structure fields of an otherwise
> uninitialized instance of this structure on their stacks, leaking
> data through the (internal or trailing) padding field.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-216.html
XSA-217 Issue Description:
> Domains controlling other domains are permitted to map pages owned by
> the domain being controlled. If the controlling domain unmaps such a
> page without flushing the TLB, and if soon after the domain being
> controlled transfers this page to another PV domain (via
> GNTTABOP_transfer or, indirectly, XENMEM_exchange), and that third
> domain uses the page as a page table, the controlling domain will have
> write access to a live page table until the applicable TLB entry is
> flushed or evicted. Note that the domain being controlled is
> necessarily HVM, while the controlling domain is PV.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-217.html
XSA-218 Issue Description:
> We have discovered two bugs in the code unmapping grant references.
>
> * When a grant had been mapped twice by a backend domain, and then
> unmapped by two concurrent unmap calls, the frontend may be informed
> that the page had no further mappings when the first call completed rather
> than when the second call completed.
>
> * A race triggerable by an unprivileged guest could cause a grant
> maptrack entry for grants to be "freed" twice. The ultimate effect of
> this would be for maptrack entries for a single domain to be re-used.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-218.html
XSA-219 Issue Description:
> When using shadow paging, writes to guest pagetables must be trapped and
> emulated, so the shadows can be suitably adjusted as well.
>
> When emulating the write, Xen maps the guests pagetable(s) to make the final
> adjustment and leave the guest's view of its state consistent.
>
> However, when mapping the frame, Xen drops the page reference before
> performing the write. This is a race window where the underlying frame can
> change ownership.
>
> One possible attack scenario is for the frame to change ownership and to be
> inserted into a PV guest's pagetables. At that point, the emulated write will
> be an unaudited modification to the PV pagetables whose value is under guest
> control.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-219.html
XSA-220 Issue Description:
> Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) and Protection Key (PKU) are features in
> newer processors, whose state is intended to be per-thread and context
> switched along with all other XSAVE state.
>
> Xen's vCPU context switch code would save and restore the state only
> if the guest had set the relevant XSTATE enable bits. However,
> surprisingly, the use of these features is not dependent (PKU) or may
> not be dependent (MPX) on having the relevant XSTATE bits enabled.
>
> VMs which use MPX or PKU, and context switch the state manually rather
> than via XSAVE, will have the state leak between vCPUs (possibly,
> between vCPUs in different guests). This in turn corrupts state in
> the destination vCPU, and hence may lead to weakened protections
>
> Experimentally, MPX appears not to make any interaction with BND*
> state if BNDCFGS.EN is set but XCR0.BND{CSR,REGS} are clear. However,
> the SDM is not clear in this case; therefore MPX is included in this
> advisory as a precaution.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-220.html
XSA-221 Issue Description:
> When polling event channels, in general arbitrary port numbers can be
> specified. Specifically, there is no requirement that a polled event
> channel ports has ever been created. When the code was generalised
> from an earlier implementation, introducing some intermediate
> pointers, a check should have been made that these intermediate
> pointers are non-NULL. However, that check was omitted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-221.html
XSA-222 Issue Description:
> Certain actions require removing pages from a guest's P2M
> (Physical-to-Machine) mapping. When large pages are in use to map
> guest pages in the 2nd-stage page tables, such a removal operation may
> incur a memory allocation (to replace a large mapping with individual
> smaller ones). If this allocation fails, these errors are ignored by
> the callers, which would then continue and (for example) free the
> referenced page for reuse. This leaves the guest with a mapping to a
> page it shouldn't have access to.
>
> The allocation involved comes from a separate pool of memory created
> when the domain is created; under normal operating conditions it never
> fails, but a malicious guest may be able to engineer situations where
> this pool is exhausted.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-222.html
XSA-224 Issue Description:
> We have discovered a number of bugs in the code mapping and unmapping
> grant references.
>
> * If a grant is mapped with both the GNTMAP_device_map and
> GNTMAP_host_map flags, but unmapped only with host_map, the device_map
> portion remains but the page reference counts are lowered as though it
> had been removed. This bug can be leveraged cause a page's reference
> counts and type counts to fall to zero while retaining writeable
> mappings to the page.
>
> * Under some specific conditions, if a grant is mapped with both the
> GNTMAP_device_map and GNTMAP_host_map flags, the operation may not
> grab sufficient type counts. When the grant is then unmapped, the
> type count will be erroneously reduced. This bug can be leveraged
> cause a page's reference counts and type counts to fall to zero while
> retaining writeable mappings to the page.
>
> * When a grant reference is given to an MMIO region (as opposed to a
> normal guest page), if the grant is mapped with only the
> GNTMAP_device_map flag set, a mapping is created at host_addr anyway.
> This does *not* cause reference counts to change, but there will be no
> record of this mapping, so it will not be considered when reporting
> whether the grant is still in use.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-224.html
2017-06-26 14:12:33 +02:00
|
|
|
})
|
2017-05-11 12:12:47 +02:00
|
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
|
meta.description = "Xen's fork of upstream Qemu";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
} // optionalAttrs withInternalTraditionalQemu {
|
|
|
|
|
"qemu-xen-traditional" = {
|
|
|
|
|
src = fetchgit {
|
|
|
|
|
url = https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/qemu-xen-traditional.git;
|
|
|
|
|
rev = "refs/tags/xen-${version}";
|
|
|
|
|
sha256 = "0mryap5y53r09m7qc0b821f717ghwm654r8c3ik1w7adzxr0l5qk";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
buildInputs = qemuDeps;
|
|
|
|
|
patches = [
|
|
|
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
|
postPatch = ''
|
|
|
|
|
substituteInPlace xen-hooks.mak \
|
|
|
|
|
--replace /usr/include/pci ${pciutils}/include/pci
|
|
|
|
|
'';
|
|
|
|
|
meta.description = "Xen's fork of upstream Qemu that uses old device model";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
} // optionalAttrs withInternalSeabios {
|
|
|
|
|
"firmware/seabios-dir-remote" = {
|
|
|
|
|
src = fetchgit {
|
|
|
|
|
url = https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/seabios.git;
|
|
|
|
|
rev = "f0cdc36d2f2424f6b40438f7ee7cc502c0eff4df";
|
|
|
|
|
sha256 = "1wq5pjkjrfzqnq3wyr15mcn1l4c563m65gdyf8jm97kgb13pwwfm";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
patches = [ ./0000-qemu-seabios-enable-ATA_DMA.patch ];
|
|
|
|
|
meta.description = "Xen's fork of Seabios";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
} // optionalAttrs withInternalOVMF {
|
|
|
|
|
"firmware/ovmf-dir-remote" = {
|
|
|
|
|
src = fetchgit {
|
|
|
|
|
url = https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/ovmf.git;
|
|
|
|
|
rev = "173bf5c847e3ca8b42c11796ce048d8e2e916ff8";
|
|
|
|
|
sha256 = "07zmdj90zjrzip74fvd4ss8n8njk6cim85s58mc6snxmqqv7gmcr";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
meta.description = "Xen's fork of OVMF";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
} // {
|
|
|
|
|
# TODO: patch Xen to make this optional?
|
|
|
|
|
"firmware/etherboot/ipxe.git" = {
|
|
|
|
|
src = fetchgit {
|
|
|
|
|
url = https://git.ipxe.org/ipxe.git;
|
|
|
|
|
rev = "356f6c1b64d7a97746d1816cef8ca22bdd8d0b5d";
|
|
|
|
|
sha256 = "15n400vm3id5r8y3k6lrp9ab2911a9vh9856f5gvphkazfnmns09";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
meta.description = "Xen's fork of iPXE";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
} // optionalAttrs withLibHVM {
|
|
|
|
|
"xen-libhvm-dir-remote" = {
|
|
|
|
|
src = fetchgit {
|
|
|
|
|
name = "xen-libhvm";
|
|
|
|
|
url = https://github.com/michalpalka/xen-libhvm;
|
|
|
|
|
rev = "83065d36b36d6d527c2a4e0f5aaf0a09ee83122c";
|
|
|
|
|
sha256 = "1jzv479wvgjkazprqdzcdjy199azmx2xl3pnxli39kc5mvjz3lzd";
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
buildPhase = ''
|
|
|
|
|
make
|
|
|
|
|
cd biospt
|
|
|
|
|
cc -Wall -g -D_LINUX -Wstrict-prototypes biospt.c -o biospt -I../libhvm -L../libhvm -lxenhvm
|
|
|
|
|
'';
|
|
|
|
|
installPhase = ''
|
|
|
|
|
make install
|
|
|
|
|
cp biospt/biospt $out/bin/
|
|
|
|
|
'';
|
|
|
|
|
meta = {
|
|
|
|
|
description = ''
|
|
|
|
|
Helper library for reading ACPI and SMBIOS firmware values
|
|
|
|
|
from the host system for use with the HVM guest firmware
|
|
|
|
|
pass-through feature in Xen'';
|
|
|
|
|
license = licenses.bsd2;
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
configureFlags = []
|
|
|
|
|
++ optional (!withInternalQemu) "--with-system-qemu" # use qemu from PATH
|
|
|
|
|
++ optional (withInternalTraditionalQemu) "--enable-qemu-traditional"
|
|
|
|
|
++ optional (!withInternalTraditionalQemu) "--disable-qemu-traditional"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
++ optional (withSeabios) "--with-system-seabios=${seabios}"
|
|
|
|
|
++ optional (!withInternalSeabios && !withSeabios) "--disable-seabios"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
++ optional (withOVMF) "--with-system-ovmf=${OVMF.fd}/FV/OVMF.fd"
|
|
|
|
|
++ optional (withInternalOVMF) "--enable-ovmf";
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-27 23:57:03 +02:00
|
|
|
patches = with xsa; flatten [
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_231
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_232
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_233
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_234_48
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_236
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_237_48
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_238
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_239
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_240_48
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_241
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_242
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_243_48
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_244
|
|
|
|
|
XSA_245
|
|
|
|
|
];
|
2017-05-11 12:12:47 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
# Fix build on Glibc 2.24.
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NIX_CFLAGS_COMPILE = "-Wno-error=deprecated-declarations";
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postPatch = ''
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# Avoid a glibc >= 2.25 deprecation warnings that get fatal via -Werror.
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sed 1i'#include <sys/sysmacros.h>' \
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-i tools/blktap2/control/tap-ctl-allocate.c \
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-i tools/libxl/libxl_device.c
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'';
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})) args
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