Home-assistant through its `--runner` commandline flag supports sending
exit code 100 when the `homeassistant.restart` service is called.
With `RestartForceExitStatus` we can listen for that specific exit code
and restart the whole systemd unit, providing an actual clean restart
with fresh processes. Additional treat exit code 100 as a successful
termination.
Configures the emulated_hue component and expects CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
to be passed in order to be able to bind to 80/tcp.
Also print the systemd security analysis, so we can spot changes more
quickly.
This is what is still exposed, and it should still allow things to work
as usual.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's … 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET… Service may allocate Internet soc… 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with som… 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP add… 0.2
✗ PrivateDevices= Service potentially has access to… 0.2
✗ PrivateUsers= Service has access to other users 0.2
✗ SystemCallFilter=~@resources System call allow list defined fo… 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's ro… 0.1
✗ SupplementaryGroups= Service runs with supplementary g… 0.1
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_UNIX Service may allocate local sockets 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for home-assistant.service: 1.6 OK :-)
This can grow to as much as ~1.9 if you use one of the bluetooth or nmap
trackers or the emulated_hue component, all of which required elevated
permisssions.
This test was failing because Firefox was displaying a download prompt
rather than the page content, presumably because mumble mumble
content-type sniffing.
By explicitly setting a content-type, the test now passes.
- In order to use GIO/GVFS it is enough to enable the gvfs service.
- The module option services.gvfs.package can be used to choose a
variation of the gvfs package, if desired.
Fixes these two deprecation warnings, by moving away from these options
towards a simple listener configuration.
> The 'bind_address' option is now deprecated and will be removed in a future version. The behaviour will default to true.
> The 'port' option is now deprecated and will be removed in a future version. Please use 'listener' instead.
Fixes: #120860
It can still network, it can only access the ssl related files if ssl is
enabled.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's network 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET|INET6) Service may allocate Internet sockets 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with some special devices 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP address allow list 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's root directory 0.1
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_UNIX Service may allocate local sockets 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for mosquitto.service: 1.1 OK 🙂
This allows us to continue to have the automatically sized image attempt
to build on Hydra, which should give us a good indication of when we've
got this fixed.
For reasons we haven't been able to work out, the aarch64 EC2 image now
regularly exceeds the output image size on hydra.nixos.org. As a
workaround, set this back to being statically sized again.
The other images do seem to build - it's just a case of the EC2 image
now being too large (occasionally non-determinstically).
This is supeer useful to allow the normal sd-image code to be used by
someone who wants to setup multiple partitions with a sd-image.
Currently I'm manually copying the sd-image file and modifying it
instead.
This ensures that newly created secrets will have the permissions
`0640`. With this change it's ensured that no sensitive information will
be word-readable at any time.
Related to #121293.
Strictly speaking this is a breaking change since each new directory
(including data-files) aren't world-readable anymore, but actually these
shouldn't be, unless there's a good reason for it.
This is what is still exposed, and it allows me to control my lamps from
within home-assistant.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's network 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET|INET6) Service may allocate Internet sockets 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with some special devices 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP address allow list 0.2
✗ PrivateDevices= Service potentially has access to hardware devices 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's root directory 0.1
✗ SupplementaryGroups= Service runs with supplementary groups 0.1
✗ MemoryDenyWriteExecute= Service may create writable executable memory mappings 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for zigbee2mqtt.service: 1.3 OK 🙂
- Set an explicit umask that allows u+rwx and g+r.
- Adds `ProtectControlGroups` and `ProtectKernelLogs`, there should be
no need to access either.
- Adds `ProtectClock` to prevent write-access to the system clock.
- `ProtectProc` hides processes from other users within the /proc
filesystem and `ProcSubSet` hides all files/directories unrelated to
the process management of the units process.
- Sets `RemoveIPC`, as there is no SysV or POSIX IPC within nginx that I
know of.
- Restricts the creation of arbitrary namespaces
- Adds a reasonable `SystemCallFilter` preventing calls to @privileged,
@obsolete and others.
And finally applies some sorting based on the order these options appear
in systemd.exec(5).
See #119615 for more details. The aarch64-linux test failed with
"qemu-system-aarch64: Virtio VGA not available" so I've restricted the
test to x86_64-linux (the virtio paravirtualized 3D graphics driver is
likely only available on very few platforms).
