Home-assistant through its `--runner` commandline flag supports sending
exit code 100 when the `homeassistant.restart` service is called.
With `RestartForceExitStatus` we can listen for that specific exit code
and restart the whole systemd unit, providing an actual clean restart
with fresh processes. Additional treat exit code 100 as a successful
termination.
This is what is still exposed, and it should still allow things to work
as usual.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's … 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET… Service may allocate Internet soc… 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with som… 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP add… 0.2
✗ PrivateDevices= Service potentially has access to… 0.2
✗ PrivateUsers= Service has access to other users 0.2
✗ SystemCallFilter=~@resources System call allow list defined fo… 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's ro… 0.1
✗ SupplementaryGroups= Service runs with supplementary g… 0.1
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_UNIX Service may allocate local sockets 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for home-assistant.service: 1.6 OK :-)
This can grow to as much as ~1.9 if you use one of the bluetooth or nmap
trackers or the emulated_hue component, all of which required elevated
permisssions.
This is supeer useful to allow the normal sd-image code to be used by
someone who wants to setup multiple partitions with a sd-image.
Currently I'm manually copying the sd-image file and modifying it
instead.
This ensures that newly created secrets will have the permissions
`0640`. With this change it's ensured that no sensitive information will
be word-readable at any time.
Related to #121293.
Strictly speaking this is a breaking change since each new directory
(including data-files) aren't world-readable anymore, but actually these
shouldn't be, unless there's a good reason for it.
This is what is still exposed, and it allows me to control my lamps from
within home-assistant.
✗ PrivateNetwork= Service has access to the host's network 0.5
✗ RestrictAddressFamilies=~AF_(INET|INET6) Service may allocate Internet sockets 0.3
✗ DeviceAllow= Service has a device ACL with some special devices 0.1
✗ IPAddressDeny= Service does not define an IP address allow list 0.2
✗ PrivateDevices= Service potentially has access to hardware devices 0.2
✗ RootDirectory=/RootImage= Service runs within the host's root directory 0.1
✗ SupplementaryGroups= Service runs with supplementary groups 0.1
✗ MemoryDenyWriteExecute= Service may create writable executable memory mappings 0.1
→ Overall exposure level for zigbee2mqtt.service: 1.3 OK 🙂
- Set an explicit umask that allows u+rwx and g+r.
- Adds `ProtectControlGroups` and `ProtectKernelLogs`, there should be
no need to access either.
- Adds `ProtectClock` to prevent write-access to the system clock.
- `ProtectProc` hides processes from other users within the /proc
filesystem and `ProcSubSet` hides all files/directories unrelated to
the process management of the units process.
- Sets `RemoveIPC`, as there is no SysV or POSIX IPC within nginx that I
know of.
- Restricts the creation of arbitrary namespaces
- Adds a reasonable `SystemCallFilter` preventing calls to @privileged,
@obsolete and others.
And finally applies some sorting based on the order these options appear
in systemd.exec(5).
On reboots and shutdowns promtail blocks for at least 90 seconds,
because it would still try to deliver log messages for loki, which isn't
possible when the network has already gone down.
Upstreams example unit also uses a ten seconds timeout, something which
has worked pretty well for me as well.
systemd-nspawn can react to SIGTERM and send a shutdown signal to the container
init process. use that instead of going through dbus and machined to request
nspawn sending the signal, since during host shutdown machined or dbus may have
gone away by the point a container unit is stopped.
to solve the issue that a container that is still starting cannot be stopped
cleanly we must also handle this signal in containerInit/stage-2.
The upstream recommended minimum length for db_key_base is 30 bytes,
which our option descriptions repeated. Recently, however, upstream
has, in many places, moved to using aes-256-gcm, which requires a key
of exactly 32 bytes. To allow for shorter keys, the upstream code pads
the key in some places. However, in many others, it just truncates the
key if it's too long, leaving it too short if it was to begin
with. This adds a patch that fixes this and updates the descriptions
to recommend a key of at least 32 characters.
See https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/53602
This version contains a vulnerability[1], and isn't maintained. The
original reason to have two jellyfin versions was to allow end-users to
backup the database before the layout was upgraded, but these backups
should be done periodically.
[1]: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21402>
An empty list results in no CapabilityBoundingSet at all, an empty
string however will set `CapabilityBoundingSet=`, which represents a
closed set.
Related: #120617
An empty list results in no CapabilityBoundingSet at all, an empty
string however will set `CapabilityBoundingSet=`, which represents a
closed set.
Related: #120617
