mirror of
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo.git
synced 2024-11-13 22:29:33 +01:00
Merge pull request '[v7.0/forgejo] use constant time check for internal token' (#5723) from bp-v7.0/forgejo-53231ba into v7.0/forgejo
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/5723 Reviewed-by: Earl Warren <earl-warren@noreply.codeberg.org>
This commit is contained in:
commit
20848116a6
2 changed files with 3 additions and 1 deletions
1
release-notes/5719.md
Normal file
1
release-notes/5719.md
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|||
Forgejo generates a token which is used to authenticate web endpoints that are only meant to be used internally, for instance when the SSH daemon is used to push a commit with Git. The verification of this token was not done in constant time and was susceptible to [timing attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_attack). A pre-condition for such an attack is the precise measurements of the time for each operation. Since it requires observing the timing of network operations, the issue is mitigated when a Forgejo instance is accessed over the internet because the ISP introduce unpredictable random delays.
|
|
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
|||
package private
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"net/http"
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ func CheckInternalToken(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|||
http.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(fields) != 2 || fields[0] != "Bearer" || fields[1] != setting.InternalToken {
|
||||
if len(fields) != 2 || fields[0] != "Bearer" || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(fields[1]), []byte(setting.InternalToken)) == 0 {
|
||||
log.Debug("Forbidden attempt to access internal url: Authorization header: %s", tokens)
|
||||
http.Error(w, http.StatusText(http.StatusForbidden), http.StatusForbidden)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue